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CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
AJ Van der Walt* and RM Shay** 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The Constitutional Court has developed a fairly robust methodology for determining 
the validity of state regulation of new and existing property rights.1 However, the 
domain of intellectual property has not received similar attention and recent 
government proclamations indicate that constitutional challenges to state regulation 
in this area could arise in the near future.2 This article assesses the Constitutional 
Court's approach to evaluating the legitimacy of state regulation of corporeal 
property rights and applies these considerations to intellectual property interests, to 
understand how the approach could and should differ. To this end we canvass the 
Constitutional Court's treatment of property rights in the face of state regulation and 
apply the contextual factors that are employed to determine the legitimacy of a 
deprivation in constitutional property cases to the setting of intellectual property law. 
We focus on the substantive arbitrariness element of the methodology laid down in 
First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance,3 to 
ascertain how the Constitutional Court approaches the interaction between the 
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1  First propounded in First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African 
Revenue Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 
(CC), especially paras 46, 100. 
2  See eg the statements made by Minister of Health Aaron Motsoaledi on the government's 
intention to curb tobacco proprietors' right to choose their own packaging: Child The Times. 
3  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC). 
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state's regulatory actions in pursuing legitimate policy goals and existing property 
rights in view of the constitutional property clause. Subsequently we turn to two 
plausible future regulatory deprivations of intellectual property rights, namely the 
anticipated plain packaging legislation in the realm of tobacco trade marks and the 
fair dealing exception to copyright for purposes of parody, in an effort to gauge how 
the current approach of the Court could work out in cases involving intellectual 
property rights. 
 
2 Constitutional property cases 
 
A good place to start is to consider what the property clause is intended to do, and 
how. Property rights are "determined and afforded by law and can be limited to 
facilitate the achievement of important social purposes".4 In this spirit, the 
constitutional property clause aims to "advance the public interest in relation to 
property".5 It therefore prevents the state from abusing its power by arbitrarily 
depriving persons of their property, or expropriating such property without just and 
equitable compensation, but it allows the state to pursue valuable social objectives 
through legitimate regulation of the use of property and, in extreme cases, through 
expropriation. 
 
This view of the property clause is reflected in the Constitutional Court's approach to 
determining the legitimacy of alleged deprivations of existing property rights. The 
Constitutional Court has had the opportunity to consider the application of section 25 
(the property clause) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution), to tangible (and even some intangible but relatively "traditional") 
property interests on a number of occasions. The first decision to formulate a 
methodology for applying the property clause of the Constitution, was that of First 
                                        
4  Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial 
Government 2009 6 SA 391 (CC) para 33. This limitation is what is referred to as regulation, 
where the state regulates (and potentially alters and restricts) the content of existing property 
rights. 
5  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 64. 
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National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance (hereafter 
FNB).6 In his decision, Ackermann J devised a 7-step methodology intended to 
establish the nature of the interest in question, whether it benefits from 
constitutional protection by virtue of the property clause, whether there was a 
deprivation of these property rights, and if so whether the deprivation is permissible 
in the constitutional context (it must be a justifiable limitation in terms of either 
section 25(1) or section 36). The methodology proceeds in suitable instances by 
evaluating, once a justifiable deprivation has been established, whether it amounts 
to an expropriation and whether just and equitable compensation was paid. 
 
The methodology formulated in the FNB decision has been largely followed by the 
Court in subsequent decisions with little deviation. 
 
The first step determines if the interest in question is in fact a property interest.7 
Apart from indicating in section 25(4)(b) that property is not limited to land, the 
property clause does not provide any definition of the property interests it covers. 
The Court cautioned that it is both practically impossible and judicially unwise to 
formulate an exhaustive definition of property,8 and in most cases it merely (yet 
safely) accepts that the interests in casu are indeed property interests. This 
approach resonates with the constitutional conception of property, according to 
which the focus falls on the function that the alleged property has in society rather 
than the traditional, pre-constitutional conceptions of property.9 
 
                                        
6  First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service; First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) (FNB). 
7  FNB para 46. A property interest is wider than a property right, but obviously includes a right. 
Interests can also include entitlements to property (eg a privilege, liberty or power to use 
particular property) and, arguably, investment-backed expectations. See further National Credit 
Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA 1 (CC) paras 61-63; Law Society of South Africa v Minister for 
Transport 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) para 84; African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba 
Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd (in Business Rescue) 2013 ZAGPPHC 259 paras 43-45. 
8  FNB para 51. 
9  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 117-118, 140. 
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In this regard, there is little doubt that South African law treats intellectual property 
rights as property interests for constitutional purposes. Certain intellectual property 
rights have been recognised as such by the Constitutional Court,10 and this position 
has been widely accepted by South African commentators,11 despite some initial 
reservations.12 Once it is established that an intellectual property interest is of a 
proprietary nature for the purposes of section 25(1), the investigation moves on to 
whether or not there was a deprivation of the said property, which is the second 
step. 
 
The original definition of deprivation - as adopted in the FNB decision - simply 
requires a regulatory interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of the 
property.13 The qualifying threshold of this definition has possibly been set slightly 
higher in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo 
City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality) (hereafter 
Mkontwana),14 which refers to a substantial interference with the use, enjoyment 
and exploitation of property by virtue of the state's inherent police power.15 This 
stricter qualifying criterion arguably does not amount to anything more than a 
superfluous semantic distraction, as the FNB definition of deprivation logically takes 
account of the de minimis principle and therefore a non-material deprivation will not 
warrant constitutional engagement.16 Nonetheless, this stricter definition has been 
adopted (or at least paid lip-service to) in subsequent constitutional property cases 
                                        
10  Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SABMARK International 2006 1 
SA 144 (CC) para 17. 
11  Du Bois 2012 SAMLJ 177-193; Louw Ambush Marketing 544 n 184; Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 143-145; Kellerman Constitutional Property Clause 323-332; Dean 2005 De Rebus 
18-22; Dean Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-3 n 3. 
12  Dean 1997 THRHR 105-119. 
13  FNB para 57. 
14  Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; Bissett v Buffalo City Municipality; 
Transfer Rights Action Campaign v MEC, Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 2005 1 SA 
530 (CC). 
15  Mkontwana para 32. Prior to this, the Constitutional Court afforded a wider interpretation to 
deprivation, saying that it encompasses "any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation 
of private property [emphasis added]": FNB para 57. See also Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 204.  
16  Van der Walt "Constitutional Property Law" 281; Van der Walt 2005 SALJ 8. 
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and now seems to be the standard that the Court applies, although it has to be said 
that the results in those cases seem to confirm the wider FNB rather than the 
narrower Mkontwana test.17 Importantly for intellectual property purposes, it is clear 
that neither definition requires direct or physical interference with the property; the 
Court only assesses if the use, enjoyment or exploitation of the property has been 
diminished.18 In view of that conclusion it seems obvious that regulatory limitations 
imposed on intellectual property interests would generally constitute deprivations of 
property for the purposes of section 25(1). 
 
After it has been established that there has indeed been a deprivation of the 
property, the third question considered by the Court is if the deprivation complies 
with the constitutive phrases of section 25(1) of the Constitution. This entails four 
distinct enquiries, namely whether the deprivation is for a public purpose or in the 
public interest (which is an implicit requirement);19 whether the deprivation is 
authorised by law of general application; whether the deprivation is effected in a 
procedurally arbitrary manner;20 and whether the deprivation is substantively 
arbitrary. As we show below, each of these distinct enquiries will apply, albeit slightly 
differently, to the determination of whether or not a regulatory deprivation of 
intellectual property complies with section 25(1). It is therefore useful to understand 
how they are applied in the context of corporeal property before undertaking this 
task in the context of incorporeal property. 
 
The authority requirement primarily ensures that any deprivation is properly 
authorised by law of general application. Authority is the threshold requirement; 
unless it is met, the deprivation is unlawful. The authorising law can be any 
                                        
17  See eg Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC); Offit Enterprises 
(Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC); Reflect-All 1025 CC v 
MEC for Public Transport, Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government 2009 6 SA 391 
(CC). 
18  Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Coega Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd 2011 1 SA 293 (CC) para 
41; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 263. 
19  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 225. 
20  This requirement is not stated explicitly in s 25(1) but was formulated in FNB para 100; see Van 
der Walt Constitutional Property Law 264. 
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legitimate source of law, including the common law,21 but formal legislation is 
obviously included. It must also be law of general application, which excludes so-
called bills of attainder and informal sources such as departmental circulars.22 
 
Section 25(1) implicitly requires that the alleged deprivation must be for a public 
purpose or in the public interest, which section 25(2) explicitly requires in cases of 
expropriation.23 The deprivation in question must be justifiable in terms of this 
reading of the property clause when determining whether the deprivation is either 
substantively or procedurally arbitrary as set out by the Constitutional Court in FNB. 
The Court evaluates if there is a generally sufficient reason for the allegedly 
infringing provision (or other source of deprivation) when considering the impact 
that it has on the property rights, which ensures that any interference with existing 
rights is at least intended to bring about a socially beneficial change.24 This logically 
implicit prerequisite, an iteration of the constitutional mandate that law should foster 
positive change, guards against whimsical or capricious regulation of property rights 
that does not serve the broader interests of society, at the expense of property 
owners. Deprivations that are aimed at achieving one of the state's core functions, 
like public health and safety, will self-evidently be legitimate, but a higher level of 
scrutiny may be appropriate when the regulation falls in a category of state 
functions that are less obviously legitimate.25 Likewise, the requirement that the 
deprivation is brought about by law of general application aims to guard against 
interference with the rights of specific owners, which could clearly also be capricious. 
There are only a few instances where property owners would have direct recourse to 
the property clause where the deprivation is suspected of being procedurally 
                                        
21  See Thebus v S 2003 6 SA 505 (CC). 
22  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 232-234. 
23  FNB para 64; Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 225. 
24  The public-purpose enquiry is not necessarily distinct in the sense of being raised earlier in time. 
The courts mostly consider this aspect as part of the general arbitrariness test, namely when 
determining what the purpose of the deprivation was: FNB para 100. 
25  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 228. 
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arbitrary,26 none of which are relevant for our current purposes. Accordingly, we 
devote the remainder of this section to the question of substantive arbitrariness. 
 
The substantive arbitrariness element of the third stage of the methodology aims to 
prevent the deprivation of property rights where the purpose and the intended 
outcome of the regulatory regime do not justify the loss or diminution of 
entitlement(s) suffered by the property owner. This is typically the most gruelling 
stage of the constitutional assessment of deprivations, as it demands that a 
"complexity of relationships" be considered to determine the likely effect that the 
deprivation will have on the rights of property owners, considered against the 
background of the regulatory scheme.27 The central question comes down to if the 
relationship or interaction between the source of the deprivation, the ends it seeks 
to achieve, the nature and extent of the deprivation and the impact of the 
restrictions it imposes constitutes a sufficient reason for the deprivation. The 
substantive arbitrariness inquiry tries to answer this question by embarking on a 
contextual investigation guided by questions as to the nature of the property rights, 
the purpose of the deprivation, and the various relationships involved (such as the 
identity of the property holder, the nature of the property, and the nature and extent 
of the deprivation) to ascertain whether the deprivation complained of can be 
justified according to the array of factors propounded in the FNB decision. These 
factors are of varying importance, depending on the relevant source of law, the 
nature of the property right, the importance of the conflicting interests, and the 
application of the particular law. The Court requires the impact of the deprivation to 
be justified by the purpose it sets out to achieve and requires the reasons for the 
deprivation to be weighed against the entitlements that the property owners will 
consequently be deprived of. The closer the connection between the deprivation and 
                                        
26  Van der Walt 2012 Stell LR 91-92. The most obvious candidates for a procedural arbitrariness 
enquiry would be deprivations of property brought about directly by legislation, without any 
administrative action and without judicial oversight. Such deprivations of intellectual property 
interests can occur as a result of statutory regulation of intellectual property interests, but it is 
difficult to speculate about their occurrence in the absence of concrete examples. 
27  FNB para 100. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & RM SHAY  PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
059 
the reason for it, the stronger the justification for the deprivation will be and the less 
likely it is to be found arbitrary. 
 
The threshold set by the word "arbitrary" as employed in this step does not 
constitute a doctrinally concrete standard that can be applied to every case that 
presents itself. Rather, it is adopted as a flexible concept that takes account of all 
the relevant factors in the particular instance, as well as the larger constitutional 
scheme that the South African Bill of Rights fits into.28 This may seem obvious, but it 
does mean that the standard of justifiability in intellectual property cases may (and 
probably will) differ from that in traditional property cases because of the scope of 
the different considerations involved. In some instances, the combination of factors 
enunciated by the Court in FNB will justify a lower level of judicial scrutiny, closer to 
mere rationality review; in others, something closer to full proportionality review 
may be required. In the context of traditional property cases, the Court has applied 
the standard by undertaking a contextual investigation regarding the nature of the 
right, the person(s) whose property is likely to be affected, the purpose of the 
deprivation and, importantly, whether there is an appropriate relationship between 
the means employed and the ends sought to be achieved.29 These factors, also 
advanced in FNB, are aimed at establishing if there is sufficient reason for the 
deprivation to save it from being substantively arbitrary. The Constitutional Court 
has subsequently in certain other cases focused the emphasis of its investigation on 
the question of whether there is a rational connection between the deprivation and 
the purposes it seeks to achieve, downplaying the complex interplay of factors 
propounded in FNB.30 This approach can be misguided in some cases, where it 
misses the point of the original factor-laden investigation, namely to contextually 
establish the strength of justification that is required in the specific instance, but in 
suitable cases a mere rationality review could indeed be (and has been found to be) 
sufficient. The elements that make up the true impact on the property owner could 
cause the threshold to gravitate either towards a rationality-type enquiry on one end 
                                        
28  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 246. 
29  FNB para 100. 
30  Mkontwana para 51. See also Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 250. 
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of the spectrum, or a proportionality-type investigation on the other. This obliges 
courts to analyse the full interplay between the myriad of relevant considerations 
before determining the required strength of the justification. Naturally, applying a 
"thin" rationality test will be appropriate where the purpose of the deprivation is 
quite important, while the deprivation is so slight that nothing more is necessary.31 
Where the deprivation falls beyond this minimal level of infraction or where the 
purpose of the deprivation is not all that evident, a "thick" proportionality-type 
standard is designed to ensure that property owners do not bear an excessive 
burden without just compensation, a standard that requires the Court to delve 
deeper into the contextual milieu of the deprivation.32 If the reason for the 
deprivation is unquestionably significant and the impact on the owner's property 
benign, a rationality-type enquiry may suffice, but in other cases a proportionality-
style investigation will be necessary to determine if the deprivation is really 
necessary and how important the public purpose that it serves actually is. However, 
even this evaluation still falls short of the full-blown, second-stage proportionality 
test resorted to when a deprivation is found to be arbitrary and must then, according 
to the fourth step of the methodology, be justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the 
Constitution to be saved from unconstitutionality.33 
 
The context of the Court's dictum in constitutional property cases reveals the 
manner in which section 25(1) protects property owners. Firstly, property owners 
are protected by the formal requirements: any deprivation of property must first and 
foremost be properly and formally authorised by law of general application that 
serves a legitimate regulatory purpose. Secondly, the level of scrutiny of regulatory 
deprivations varies according to the significance of the regulatory goal and the 
seriousness of the deprivation. When the incident of ownership that is affected is 
slight, the public purpose involved is overwhelmingly important, or when the 
deprivation is not enduring, rationality may be a sensible standard to revert to; but 
                                        
31  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 255. 
32  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 237-241. 
33  However, this second investigation will likely not save a deprivation that has been found arbitrary 
in any instance, as the applicable standard of justification will necessarily be higher. 
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when the deprivation has more far-reaching consequences or is for a less-obviously 
legitimate public purpose with a dubious chance of achieving its aims, it is prudent 
to adopt the more vigorous proportionality standard to bring the legitimacy of the 
regulation under stricter scrutiny. The discretion left to the court in this regard 
should be exercised with due regard for the factors propounded in the FNB decision 
to afford some degree of certainty without compromising the flexibility that is 
required in these cases.34 Thirdly, the procedural and substantive arbitrariness test 
ensures that a deprivation of property is not disproportionate. A contextual test 
guarantees that the effect of the deprivation is commensurate with its legitimate 
regulatory goal. 
 
What happens if a deprivation is arbitrary according to the test? According to FNB it 
is unconstitutional and invalid unless it can be justified in terms of section 36(1). 
However, that is unlikely because the procedural or substantive considerations that 
would render a deprivation arbitrary would also prevent it from being justified in 
terms of section 36(1). It is therefore improbable that a regulatory deprivation that 
is found to be arbitrary could be saved by section 36 justification. More importantly, 
however, the FNB approach suggests (and subsequent decisions seem to confirm) 
that an arbitrary regulatory deprivation cannot be saved by judicially converting it 
into an expropriation and demanding compensation.35 
 
Finally, according to the FNB test a deprivation that is either not arbitrary or, if it is 
arbitrary, is justified in terms of section 36(1), could be reviewed further in terms of 
the requirements of section 25(2), since expropriation is a subset of deprivation 
according to FNB. However, since there is no common law authority for 
expropriation in South African law and since IP rights are almost exclusively created 
and regulated in legislation, the expropriation issue in IP cases would mostly come 
up in the form that it adopted in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 
                                        
34  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 256; Roux "Property" 24. 
35  Known as regulatory taking in US law or as constructive expropriation in South African literature; 
see in general Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 347ff. See the discussion below. 
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(hereafter AgriSA),36 namely as a question as to whether legislation could either 
bring about expropriation directly, without administrative action, in terms of the 
mere promulgation of legislation (this was held not to have been the case according 
to the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Act 28 of 2002,37 but not excluded 
generally); or, secondly, whether South African law could accommodate constructive 
expropriation, where the state does not formally expropriate but the regulatory 
deprivation is said to have such dire effects that it needs to be treated as 
expropriation and compensated. In the main judgment in AgriSA the Constitutional 
Court either precluded or severely qualified this possibility by stating that 
expropriation is characterised by the acquisition of the property. In the absence of 
acquisition (either by the state or someone else) there can be no expropriation. 
Given the fact that the state would seldom acquire intellectual property interests 
through regulatory legislation, there seems to be very little chance of constructive 
expropriation in this area. 
 
3 Intellectual property 
 
It is clear from the above analysis that the Court enjoys considerable discretion in 
applying the fluctuating standard of justification for deprivations. While this 
discretion is contingent on the purpose and extent of the deprivation, Mkontwana's 
emphasis on the extent of the deprivation as an indicator of the appropriate 
standard of scrutiny might downplay the other factors propounded in FNB, if 
followed to the letter.38 A rational connection between the deprivation complained of 
and the alleged impact it has may be sufficient for minimal deprivations, but this 
approach could neglect the importance of other considerations that can play a 
crucial role in the interplay between conflicting constitutional rights, especially when 
intellectual property interests are involved. This is because, while in both Mkontwana 
and FNB the legislation in question was aimed at allowing government to gather 
taxes (which is clearly a legitimate purpose that falls within the state's regulatory 
                                        
36  Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA 1 (CC). 
37  AgriSA para 69. 
38  Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 249. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & RM SHAY  PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
063 
police power), in the case of regulatory deprivations of intellectual property it is 
likely that other human rights will also be involved.39 
 
However, the purpose of the property clause must be kept in mind when applying it 
to intellectual property interests. One obvious factor that sets intellectual property 
apart from land and one of the causes for a property clause being included in the 
Constitution is that land was previously the subject of extensive state abuse by 
means of unjust eviction, whereas similar injustices cannot be said to have occurred 
with intellectual property, or at least not on the same scale.40 The property clause 
was designed, inter alia, to foster equitable access to and redistribution of land and 
other natural resources while providing adequate security to property owners. This 
shows an implicit recognition that the protection of existing property interests can be 
subservient to the pursuit of other human rights through the structure and 
application of section 25. The way that the property clause is applied to minerals 
and other natural resources again takes account of past injustices and entrenched 
inequalities, showing an awareness of the requisite differentiation between 
traditional property interests and less conventional property interests.41 This 
redistributive function cannot be transposed to intellectual property per se, and a 
nuanced approach must be devised to ensure that intellectual property owners 
benefit from constitutional protection in a way that serves the values underlying and 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. This does not mean that the standard of protection 
granted to intellectual property should be of a lower order. Rather, the spirit, object 
and purport of the Bill of Rights generally and the property clause specifically 
mandate that constitutional protection should be awarded in such a manner that it 
allows state regulation of a similar character to the regulation of tangible property. 
The property clause is concerned with enabling legitimate state regulation of 
property interests in South African society, and the body of constitutional property 
case law has shown the character of regulation that it allows. However, the factors 
                                        
39  The rights to freedom of expression and health care are often invoked as justification for limiting 
rights in copyright and patents respectively. 
40  An argument to this effect could be made in relation to traditional knowledge, but that falls 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
41  AgriSA case. 
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relevant to the determination of whether state regulation is justified or not should be 
tailored to the nature and purposes of intellectual property. 
 
One consideration that should feature prominently in the constitutional inquiry as 
applied to intellectual property is the role of the property rights regime. The purpose 
of awarding property rights in creative works, inventions, and commercial names 
and marks is naturally very different from the function of property rights in corporeal 
property. The private property status of intellectual property rights tends to afford it 
moral and legal primacy in many parts of the world.42 For this reason the property 
rights category is not in itself helpful when evaluating the legitimacy of state 
regulation, and relying on it uncritically could even be detrimental to the public 
interest and the beneficial development and application of the law.43 The Court 
should be cognisant of this and guard against the unwarranted influence that this 
categorisation could have in the face of conflict as a result of the inevitable 
conclusions that arise from this categorisation. However, this is not to say that 
intellectual property interests should not be treated as property. On the contrary, the 
property clause can be of great value if it is applied to intellectual property with the 
requisite differentiation. Notwithstanding, like all property rights, it should be 
considered in the light of its purpose and reined in accordingly. A myopic vision can 
be avoided if the purpose of the property rights regime and the constitutional 
property clause is properly understood. The purpose of the constitutional property 
clause is instructive in this sense, and should be used to inform the way intellectual 
property is treated in constitutional cases. The Court must recognise that intellectual 
property legislation is an instrument of policy and strive to protect the policy 
                                        
42  This is seen in Canadian case law, notably in the decision of Compagnie Générale des 
Établissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and 
General Workers Union of Canada (CAW-Canada) 1997 2 FC 306, where the Federal Court of 
Canada acknowledged the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal property and then 
promptly ignored the distinction. For a discussion of the detrimental effects of this incorrect 
categorisation, see Craig Copyright, Communication and Culture 208-213. 
43  Craig Copyright, Communication and Culture 96. To the contrary, see generally Rahmatian 
Copyright and Creativity 1-12, where the author approvingly analyses the property status of 
copyright works and shows how various analogies between traditional property rights and 
intellectual property rights can be useful to understanding the functioning of the latter. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & RM SHAY  PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
065 
objectives accordingly, including cultural, economic and political policy choices that 
inform the property rights.44 
 
A number of things set intellectual property apart from corporeal property and these 
considerations are crucial to the proper application of the property clause to 
intellectual property. The most obvious difference is that the objects of intellectual 
property rights such as copyright and patents are non-rivalrous and non-exhaustive, 
meaning that the objects of the rights can be enjoyed by more than one person at 
any given time and will not be extinguished or diminished by their use.45 This is in 
stark contrast to corporeal property. The implication is that the rights in intellectual 
property are the only things that can be exploited. While an object of property can 
be physically enjoyed as well as commercially exploited, the only way to 
meaningfully use an invention or creative work is to exploit the rights commercially. 
If the intellectual property owner wanted to enjoy her property only privately and 
not exploit the economic rights awarded to her, state interference with the rights 
would be of no consequence because the object of the rights can still be enjoyed by 
the author or inventor. This is clearly not true of corporeal property, where the right 
of exclusion is essential to the proper private enjoyment of the property. The 
exclusionary nature of the rights in corporeal property is therefore different from 
rights in intellectual property. This leads to the next distinction - the raison d'être of 
the property rights regime governing intellectual property. Without exclusive rights in 
creative works and inventions, there will be no incentive to create such objects (or 
so the theory goes). Exclusive rights in trade marks again serve a different function, 
which is taken up below. For constitutional property purposes, this means that the 
purpose of the system of rights is markedly different from that governing corporeal 
property, which is designed inter alia to regulate scarcity.46 It follows that certain 
rights will be more easily regulated than others, depending on how integral they are 
to the future creation of similar objects.47 As alluded to above, the rights in 
                                        
44  Davies Copyright and the Public Interest 237. 
45  Mossoff "Introduction" xvi; Boyle Public Domain 19-20. 
46  Posner Economic Analysis of Law 30-35. 
47  Eg, as shown below, the right to prohibit certain adaptations of a copyright work is less integral 
to the incentive to create than the right of reproduction. 
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intellectual property are primarily of an economic nature,48 which must also be taken 
into account, especially when they conflict with civic rights such as equality or 
privacy. Any deprivation of intellectual property rights must therefore be conducive 
to maintaining an adequate incentive to promote a culture of creative and scientific 
innovation to ensure the sustainability of the intellectual property regime. 
 
These factors are highly relevant to determining if a limitation of intellectual property 
rights will in fact serve the public interest. Sometimes the public purpose inherent in 
a limitation will not be clear immediately and a thorough investigation of the aims of 
the regulatory measure must be undertaken. In some instances, however, the public 
purpose that is sought to be achieved will prima facie constitute a robust justification 
for the deprivation. One example is the current debate on the constitutionality of 
plain packaging legislation in the context of trade marks used in relation to tobacco 
products to promote better public health.49 In such a case, is a rationality standard 
sufficient to take account of all the relevant implications of the deprivation? The 
summary nature of a rationality enquiry would suggest not. For a rational link to be 
sufficient, the public purpose would have to be very strong and the deprivation not 
very extensive, which is arguably not the case with the proposed plain packaging 
legislation. 
 
With trade marks, the purpose of awarding rights is again different to both corporeal 
property and other forms of intellectual property. Trade marks primarily serve a 
distinguishing function,50 designed to enable consumers to make an informed choice 
between different products of the same nature. Some argue that the value of a trade 
mark can also be constituted by acquired value in the visual elements of a mark.51 
                                        
48  The moral rights of an author of a copyright work would be one exception, but these rights have 
no bearing on the legitimacy of state regulation because they are not concerned with the use, 
enjoyment or exploitation of the property. 
49  See in this regard Dean 2013 http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/files/2013/05/Prof-Owen-H-
Dean_Inaugural-lecture_15-May_final-version.pdf; Harms 2013 http://web.up.ac.za/sitefiles/ 
file/47/10568/PLAIN%20PACKAGING%20AND%20THE%20FUTURE%20OF%20TRADEMARK%20
LAW.pdf; Castleman 2013 Without Prejudice 60-61; Stilwell 2012 Without Prejudice 60-61. 
50  S 9 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993. 
51  Dean 2013 http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/files/2013/05/Prof-Owen-H-Dean_Inaugural-lecture_15-
May_final-version.pdf. 
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This argument holds that the regulation of the visual elements of a trade mark will 
cause a diminution in value and consequently constitute a deprivation at the very 
least. However, given the stated purpose of trade mark law, a court might well allow 
the regulation of trade marks in the public interest when it is undertaken for a 
legitimate governmental purpose, such as public health.52 However, given the 
extensive impact that such regulation would have on existing trade marks if the 
stated purpose were to be achieved, a proportionality-type enquiry that takes 
account of the efficacy of the proposed measures will be necessary to avert any 
chance of undue harm to trade mark owners before they are stripped of the value of 
their marks. If a conflict does arise between public health objectives and intellectual 
property rights, the policy objectives of both rights could assist the courts in 
mediating the tension by examining the aims of the regulatory scheme. If the public 
health measure (the plain packaging legislation) cannot be said to effectively achieve 
its aims, intellectual property rights should be given their due in trying to achieve 
their aims by allowing trade mark owners to meaningfully distinguish their particular 
product from others. 
 
It must be noted that when the policy decision is made to promote public health, the 
section 25 analysis is completely irrelevant. This becomes relevant only once the 
decision has been taken, a regulatory scheme has been implemented, and its effects 
are to be assessed in terms of section 25(1). The reason for this distinction is the 
fact that section 25 guarantees property interests only negatively, in other words 
against either improper deprivation or improper expropriation. In the absence of a 
positive guarantee section 25 kicks in only once there actually has been either a 
deprivation or an expropriation of property. Prior to that - when policy is debated - 
the impact that the proposed measures will have on other interests (such as 
intellectual property interests) can be decided on the basis of a straight-forward 
balancing and policy-making exercise. General property considerations are relevant 
here, but section 25 considerations are not. If public health interests are judged to 
be more important than purely economic interests such as trade marks, the policy 
                                        
52  A 8(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (1994) allows 
the curtailment of intellectual property rights for the purposes of public health. 
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will be legitimate if it can be said to be effective in its aims. Only once the policy has 
been implemented and legislation has been promulgated accordingly does the more 
complicated section 25(1) exercise of balancing take place with due regard for the 
complexity of relationships propounded in FNB. This is where a particular legislative 
instrument or provision may be found to be in conflict with the section 25 
requirements. This means that the relevant existing property interests must be 
considered when policy is being debated and the potential impact that the proposed 
scheme will have on them recognised, but it does not mean that the proposed 
scheme should be criticised or abandoned merely because it will bring about a 
deprivation of these interests. Instead, it should be considered whether the 
regulatory scheme under discussion will bring about an arbitrary deprivation of 
property and, if it does, whether its impact can be mitigated to save it from being 
unconstitutional on this ground after it has been implemented. 
 
The factors propounded by Ackermann J in FNB53 suggest that the Court (and by 
implication the state when debating policy and drafting legislation) should take into 
account, before implementing the invasive measures, if less invasive means are 
available to achieve the intended outcome when the effects of a deprivation are 
conceivably severe. Although the state is not required to consider less invasive 
means when pursuing an expropriation, this is justified by the fact that just and 
equitable compensation is due to the property owner in the case of expropriation.54 
When the government regulation does not amount to expropriation but still limits the 
use, enjoyment and exploitation of the property significantly, and strict scrutiny is 
appropriate, it follows that if less invasive means are available to achieve the same 
purpose with similar efficacy but less restriction on property rights, this should be 
pursued before the state is permitted to restrict property rights. Even though the 
stated government purpose of combating the deleterious effects of tobacco products 
on public health is legitimate and compelling as an aim, the complexity of relations 
espoused in FNB requires that the full impact of such regulation be assessed. A 
                                        
53  FNB para 100. 
54  See in this regard Slade 2013 TSAR 199-216. 
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rationality test would therefore not be appropriate, as it may neglect the 
complicating factors involved. 
 
Various foreign governments have delayed or abandoned their plans to introduce 
plain packaging measures, citing a lack of sufficient evidence that regulation of this 
nature will have the desired impact.55 The problem with adopting the more cursory 
rationality standard of review in this case is clear: it allows the state to pursue 
legitimate aims without ensuring that the means will be effective to achieve the 
ends, or will even have the best chance out of all of the available options of 
achieving the objectives, when these objectives are overwhelming in terms of public 
policy decisions. The propriety of this reasoning is therefore open to questioning, as 
it could allow burdensome and ineffective regulation. For this reason, once 
regulatory legislation of this nature has been implemented the court should take all 
factors into account in its contextual analysis before deciding on the suitable 
standard of justification. A study of the efficacy of plain packaging will be more 
advantageous if undertaken before the proposed measures are adopted, as this will 
present direct evidence of the likelihood of the regulation's achieving its intended 
goal. Relying on previous studies undertaken by tobacco or anti-tobacco lobbies 
would not be sufficient to establish the likelihood that such statutory regulation will 
be effective, given their obvious agendas.56 Similarly, diverging conclusions drawn by 
foreign governments would not be helpful either. An independent study should be 
commissioned by the Minister of Health to establish the likely effects on intellectual 
property rights and the likelihood of the measure's being effective before such a 
measure is adopted. This would substantially improve the chances of such an action 
being found non-arbitrary when it is implemented and challenged before the Court, 
as it inevitably will be. 
 
                                        
55  The United Kingdom decided to delay adopting plain packaging legislation until evidence could 
be presented that it would be effective. 
56  See eg Moodie et al 2011 Tobacco Control 367-373 counterposed against the submission 
prepared for the UK Department of Health by Philip Morris Limited in 2012: Philip Morris Limited 
2012 http://www.pmi.com/eng/tobacco_regulation/submissions/documents/submission %20and 
%20all%20annexes%20(combined).pdf. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & RM SHAY  PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
070 
If no such research is conducted, a myriad of factors will inform the evaluation of 
arbitrariness. One important factor could be the tobacco industry's contentions of the 
increased likelihood of counterfeit cigarettes being passed off as a particular brand,57 
and smuggling these counterfeit products could feasibly become easier.58 It has also 
been contended that plain packaging legislation will increase price competition 
between tobacco proprietors, which could have a counter-productive result by 
making these products more affordable and thus more available to the youth 
market.59 These factors, as well as the risk of non-compliance with international 
obligations,60 should inform the proportionality-type inquiry in the context of 
arbitrary deprivation. This is what is meant by "a complexity of relationships" that 
must be considered within the stricter scrutiny that proportionality entails, to avoid a 
simplistic determination of the impact that the deprivation that a rationality review 
would allow could have on the rights of the property owner. This is not to say that a 
regulatory scheme that brings about a deprivation of property interests is necessarily 
constitutionally flawed. Only if the deprivation is arbitrary will it be constitutionally 
invalid. This is precisely what the focus on a complexity of relationships seeks to 
establish by forcing courts to consider the nature and extent of the deprivation, the 
purpose that it seeks to achieve, and the nature of the property.  The culmination of 
these factors will point to whether or not the regulatory scheme is constitutionally 
assailable because it is not justified and therefore arbitrary. The mere fact that a 
deprivation will result is no cause for alarm. 
 
The methodology will not always require such rigorous scrutiny of the regulation. 
Turning to copyright, a fair dealing exception for the purposes of parody serves as a 
good example of a case where a rationality standard can be safely adopted as the 
                                        
57  The situation regarding counterfeit goods is regulated by the Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997. 
58  See eg Deloitte 2011 http://www.bata.com.au/group/sites/bat_7wykg8.nsf/vwPagesWebLive 
/DO7WZEX6/$FILE/medMD8EHAM5.pdf. 
59  Philip Morris Limited in 2012: Philip Morris Limited 2012 http://www.pmi.com/ 
eng/tobacco_regulation/submissions/documents/submission 
%20and%20all%20annexes%20(combined).pdf 11. 
60  The Republic of Cuba joined the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Ukraine in filing a dispute 
with the World Trade Organisation alleging that Australia's plain packaging legislation is 
inconsistent with their obligations under, inter alia, the TRIPS agreement. See WTO 2013 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news13_e/ds458rfc_03may13_e.htm. 
AJ VAN DER WALT & RM SHAY  PER / PELJ 2014(17)1 
 
 
071 
appropriate standard of justification. The South African Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
does not currently make an exception for parodists who use an existing work as the 
target or vehicle for their commentary. If a fair dealing exception for the purposes of 
parody were introduced, it would in some cases amount to a deprivation of the 
copyright owners' rights, as the owner would in theory be able to license this use as 
an adaptation (although foreign case law indicates that it is a very rarely that the 
owner will in fact license this use).61 The effect of the proposed provision would be 
to convert the right that copyright owners currently enjoy to license or object to 
parodies to a privilege available to all users of copyright works. This would allow any 
member of the public to use a work that has been made available to the public in a 
transformative and creative manner to create a new work that uses parody as a 
medium to take aim at the original, or to use the original to criticise aspects of 
society more generally.62 This article does not address the desirability of this 
statutory shift, but only its justifiability in terms of the impact it would have on the 
rights of copyright owners from a constitutional perspective.63 
 
Copyright owners would not be able to prohibit parodying uses of their work as they 
are able to do currently. The introduction of a parody exception would therefore 
amount to a regulatory interference with the exploitation of the work, as the owner 
is able to licence or prevent parodies of her work as the law stands. Even under the 
conception of deprivation as applied in Mkontwana, where a material interference 
with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of the property is arguably required, 
preventing copyright owners from objecting to the use of their work as the basis for 
a derivative parodying work is quite conceivably material. It can therefore be 
accepted that the proposed exception would constitute a deprivation, as it would 
deprive the owner of the rights she would otherwise be able to assert in all cases of 
artistic or otherwise creative parody. Transferring property entitlements (by 
                                        
61  See eg Wright v Warner Bros Inc 953 F 2d 731 (2nd Cir 1991); Fisher v Dees 794 F 2d 432 (9th 
Cir 1986); Pro Arts Inc v Hustler Magazine Inc 787 F 2d 592 (6th Cir 1986). See also generally 
Patry and Perlmutter 1992 CAELJ 667-719.  
62  For the various ways that a parody can use a work to deliver comment or opinion, see Deazley 
2010 MLR 790; Merges 1993 AIPLA QJ 311-312; Patry and Perlmutter 1992 CAELJ 714-715. 
63  For a normative justification of the proposed statutory amendment, see Van der Walt and Shay 
2013 SAMLJ 1-12. 
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converting the right to prohibit the parodying treatment of a work to a privilege 
allowing any person to do so) is not problematic for constitutional property 
purposes, as rights acquired before the constitutional dispensation may be subjected 
to new or more stringent regulations and control of their use and exploitation.64 The 
realignment of private rights to effect a better alignment with the public interest is 
exactly what section 25 enables.65 All that is required in such cases is that the effect 
of the new or additional regulation should not be disproportionate in the sense that 
it should be properly justified and therefore should not amount to regulatory 
excess.66 One of the most important functions of the constitutional property clause is 
to authorise and legitimate state regulation that would promote constitutional 
goals.67 The substantive arbitrariness investigation is intended to determine if the 
deprivation in question contributes to constitutionally acceptable aims. Accordingly, it 
must be justifiable in terms of the provisions of section 25(1).68 
 
The exception would deprive owners of a particular right (the right to object to the 
derivative, transformative use of their works for purposes of creating a parody) only 
in certain circumstances, and the extent of the deprivation would therefore be very 
limited. The relationship between the means employed (the exception) and the ends 
sought to be achieved is of paramount importance; the more loosely connected they 
are, the closer to the proportionality end of the spectrum the justification needs to 
be. The purpose of copyright law itself must be considered in conjunction with the 
guarantee of freedom of expression in section 16 of the Constitution, and the two 
must be reconciled if possible. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that 
copyright law strives to achieve a balance between incentivising authors to create 
works for public benefit and limiting the rights granted to these authors in the public 
interest. The property rights granted to authors are therefore not ends in 
                                        
64  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 125. 
65  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 127. 
66  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 127. 
67  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 141. 
68  For present purposes, the questions of whether there was authority for the deprivation, whether 
the deprivation was brought about by law of general application and whether it is procedurally 
arbitrary can be glossed over. If the exception is promulgated by properly enacted legislation, 
neither of these questions will pose any difficulty. 
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themselves. They serve as means to promote the creation of valuable works and 
should extend no further than is necessary to achieve this goal and appropriately 
reward authors. Limiting owners' rights to prohibit parody could serve this purpose 
by allowing critical and non-critical transformative uses of copyright works to 
flourish. Removing the barrier of consent that currently prevents such uses would 
show a very strong relationship between the means to be employed (the statutory 
provision that exempts the parodying use of copyright works) and the purpose of the 
provision (encouraging potential creators to engage in the creative process and 
promoting the value of free speech). This would tie in with the third factor that 
Ackermann J set out in FNB, namely the relationship between the purpose of the 
deprivation in question and the person whose property is affected. The affected 
parties would obviously be copyright owners, regardless of whether they intend to 
exploit their works for commercial benefit or not. Interestingly, copyright owners 
who do not wish to capitalise on their works will have their economic (as opposed to 
moral) rights affected to a similar degree to those who do wish to exploit their works 
for economic benefit. This is evident from the fact that parodies do not impact on 
the market for the original, or compete in the same market as the original.69 This 
particular application of the right to authorise an adaptation would not meaningfully 
add to or detract from the incentive to create, and would therefore leave the 
prevailing model of copyright law largely untouched. Accordingly, the deprivation in 
question would have a benign relationship with the exploitability of the works, 
regardless of the owner's commercial intent. 
 
The Constitutional Court made the sweeping statement that, generally speaking, 
when the property in question is of a corporeal nature a more compelling purpose 
will be required to justify the deprivation.70 More tellingly, if the alleged deprivation 
does not extend to all incidents of ownership and only partially to those that it does 
affect, a less compelling justification can survive constitutional scrutiny. All of the 
above considerations gravitate towards the rationality end of the spectrum. It then 
becomes clear that the proposed provision to allow for a parody exception would not 
                                        
69  Patryand& Perlmutter 1992 CAELJ 693. 
70  FNB para 100. 
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pose any material threat to the constitutional rights of copyright owners, but rather 
would contribute to an equitable balance between the intellectual property rights of 
copyright owners and the public use of copyright works. 
 
This analysis shows how the complexity of relationships should be considered in 
intellectual property law, where the relevant factors are markedly different from 
those considered in property cases. 
 
4 Subsidiarity 
 
Having ascertained the constitutional permissibility of a fair dealing exception for the 
purposes of parody, it should be pointed out that a parody cannot be exempted 
under the Copyright Act as it stands, regardless of the constitutional importance of 
free speech or the fact that this occurred in the context of trade marks. In Laugh It 
Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SABMARK International 
(hereafter Laugh It Off),71 the Constitutional Court made it clear that the value of 
freedom of expression underlying parody constitutes a legitimate basis for 
challenging the exercise of intellectual property rights in the context of trade marks. 
This conclusion was reached without requiring statutory amendment, as the Court 
was able to read the provisions of the Trade Marks Act in such a way that it allowed 
the parodying uses of trade marks without amounting to infringement. Sachs J 
stated that allowing parodies of trade marks is not a limitation of property rights, but 
rather an exercise of balancing competing rights in the Bill of Rights.72 This is 
correct, as the trade mark proprietor is able to exercise her rights uninhibited in the 
normal course of trade, and the parody does not interfere with this or limit any 
specific right in the conceptual bundle. The problem is that the Copyright Act does 
not lend itself to similar interpretation, as the parody of a copyright work will 
                                        
71  Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a SABMARK International 2006 1 
SA 144 (CC). 
72  If this were a s 25 case, straight-forward balancing would not be appropriate for the reasons 
given above, as this type of balancing is relevant (as far as economic rights like property are 
concerned) only in the policy formulation stage. Instead, the balancing of rights would be best 
undertaken in accordance with the post-deprivation approach in FNB. 
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necessarily constitute at least an adaptation of the original work, an exclusive right 
that vests with copyright. Copyright owners therefore enjoy the right to prohibit 
parodies of their works, which cannot be said to be consistent with the values of 
freedom of expression or congruent with the position in trade mark law. Amending 
legislation would of course alter this position, as the copyright owner currently 
enjoys the right to object to the reproduction or adaptation of her work, which a 
parody would necessarily comprise. The legislation would therefore limit this right 
(or at least limit its application in certain instances) if it were to legitimate parodies, 
with the justification resting on the public interest in freedom of expression. 
 
If the issue were brought before a court and the competing rights weighed against 
each other, the nature of the particular rights could also be instructive. Intellectual 
property rights, like property rights generally, are purely economic rights, which will 
often have to bow to civic rights like freedom of expression. This does not mean that 
a simplistic determination of the relative weights to be given to the conflicting rights 
is appropriate. This kind of balancing can take place only during a policy debate in 
the legislature or in the public domain, before legislation is enacted. Once the 
objectives have been balanced in the policy stage and legislation has been 
implemented, a more structured judicial balancing exercise should take place in 
accordance with FNB,73 which would indicate whether or not the statutory balance 
struck by legislation is in line with the constitutional imperatives contained in section 
25(1). However, this is quite different from abstractly balancing the freedom of 
expression with property rights, as section 25(1) determines only whether the 
statutory regime unjustifiably limits property rights, not vice versa. An important 
consideration in this regard is the fact that section 25 guarantees property only in 
the negative, which means that the provision (and the guarantee) is activated only 
once a deprivation or expropriation of property is on the table. This suggests that an 
abstract weighing of section 25 property rights against other constitutional 
guarantees like the freedom of speech is unlikely to occur in the judicial (as opposed 
to the legislative) context. 
                                        
73  FNB para 100. 
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The Copyright Act is the exclusive regulator of this form of intellectual property 
rights in South Africa. Once it is accepted that intellectual property, and more 
specifically copyright, benefits from constitutional protection, it follows that the 
Copyright Act should accord with constitutional values generally and the property 
clause specifically, despite its pre-constitutional origins. Specifically, the Constitution 
demands that property rights be reassessed to allow unhampered freedom of 
expression to the extent that copyright owners are no longer able to wield the 
(presumably unintended) sword of private censorship of others' views of their works. 
Awarding copyright owners a property right to prohibit creative criticism of their 
works devalues the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression as well as the 
very objectives that underlie copyright law, and can even be said to prevent citizens 
from actively participating in our constitutional democracy by unjustifiably 
suppressing divergent voices. The constitutional demand for legislative development 
is clear, in the absence of which there can be no exemption of this form of speech. 
 
While the parody of works that have been made available to the public is clearly an 
embodiment of the constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of expression, as 
reflected in the Laugh It Off decision, the legislature should not be fooled into 
thinking that section 16 of the Constitution affords adequate protection in the 
context of copyright. The principle of subsidiarity precludes this right from being 
invoked in the absence of a specific legislative provision that gives it embodiment, 
save for where the Act is alleged to be unconstitutional. In the Laugh It Off case the 
defendant was able to rely on an existing provision in the Trade Marks Act, which, 
informed by section 16, proved a valid defence that he had in fact not infringed the 
property rights of the trade mark proprietor. This cannot be the case in a copyright 
action, as a parody will not easily fit into the structure of any of the existing 
exempting provisions. Trade mark owners are protected from the dilution of their 
marks, while copyright owners are protected from any unauthorised uses of their 
works that are not explicitly exempted. Accordingly, the court will not be able to 
apply section 16 directly to exempt users' conduct, regardless of the legitimacy of 
the parody, and must merely apply the statutory content and limitations that the 
Copyright Act provides. Pre-constitutional legislation necessarily does not have the 
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imputed legislative intention of advancing constitutional principles, which means that 
sometimes legislation will have an incongruent relationship with the values that an 
open and democratic society strives to achieve.74 In cases of legislation predating 
the constitutional era, the subsidiarity principles are used to test the validity of 
legislation and common law rules for constitutional compliance. In the interest of 
adhering to the principles of subsidiarity as established by the Constitutional Court, 
legislation that does not adequately recognise a value, rule, principle or right 
enshrined in the Constitution must be made to accommodate the neglected interest. 
Of the various ways in which this can be achieved, the only avenue that avails itself 
to the issue under discussion is legislative amendment.75 Balancing property and 
other constitutional rights must occur when proper judicial interpretation fails to 
resolve the conflict and the legislation in question blatantly neglects a valuable civic 
right.76 It is obvious that the Copyright Act - promulgated in 1978 and only scantly 
revisited since - was not intended to give effect to a constitutional right or value, 
and thus exposes itself to purposive interpretation or, failing that, to direct 
challenge.77 Allowing parodying uses of a copyright work cannot meaningfully be 
"read in" to the Copyright Act in the absence of an explicit fair dealing exception, 
meaning that purposive interpretation will be a stretch. For this reason the 
appropriate balancing exercise cannot lead to the resolution of the conflict. The issue 
is therefore not one that can be addressed at the legislator's convenience, as 
evidenced by the constitutional justifications for the exception advanced above and 
the growing need for this expansion of creative freedom.78 Short of a very 
determined parodist bringing the issue to the Constitutional Court's attention, the 
legislation will continue to act as a deterrent to all burgeoning parody artists. 
 
                                        
74  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 67; Van der Walt 2008 CCR 101, 104. 
75  There is no room in s 12 of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 to "read in" the required exception, 
even under the awning of criticism or review. For a discussion of why this is the case, see Van 
der Walt and Shay 2013 SAMLJ 10. Reading down will also not be feasible, as the rights granted 
to copyright owners (in particular, the rights of reproduction and adaptation) cannot be 
meaningfully limited only in certain instances by judicial interpretation, as will be required in the 
present case. Legislative involvement then becomes inevitable. 
76  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 44. 
77  Van der Walt Property and Constitution 40-41. 
78  See Van der Walt and Shay 2013 SAMLJ 1-12. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
The above analyses show that constitutional property case law can be helpful in 
determining the legitimacy of state interference with intellectual property rights, but 
not without the requisite differentiation. The purpose of the various systems of 
property rights must be kept in mind when considering how they interact with the 
property clause, and the underlying rationales for awarding rights should direct the 
standard of justifiability that state regulation must meet. The different underlying 
objectives of the statutory regimes governing copyright and trade mark law 
respectively illustrate this point in the context of intellectual property. Due emphasis 
on the purpose of awarding property rights in immaterial objects will ensure that the 
incentives that these rights provide are kept intact and the function that the property 
regime serves in society is maintained. The property clause can be a guiding force in 
ensuring that intellectual property interests are given due regard when unrelated 
policy objectives compete with vested interests in intellectual property. Markedly 
different considerations will necessarily be relevant in copyright and trade mark law 
respectively, and it will be interesting to see how the Constitutional Court applies the 
methodology propounded in FNB to issues of intellectual property. It is imperative 
that the Court does not get caught up in the strictures of property language, but 
rather recognises it as a useful analogy that conveys the importance of the rights in 
question and the place they have in ordering relationships in society. The same basic 
function of ensuring that state interference with vested (intellectual) property rights 
can still be served if the property clause is understood in this way.  
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